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When the Supreme Court of Canada awarded Kevin Keays $500,000 in punitive 
damages on top of damages equal to fifteen months’ reasonable notice in the 2008 
case, Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays (“Keays”), it became one of the most contro­
versial decisions to come out of Canada’s highest court in over a decade.1 Employ­
ees and their representatives viewed the decision as adding another arrow to their 
quiver, particularly as regards punitive damages, but the case opened the door to a 
number of new questions and problems. While mainstream media seized, with some 
reason, upon the unprecedented punitive damages award, in reality that was only 
one of the important employment law issues dealt with in the contentious decision.
The principles and underlying approach taken by the trial judge withstood 
a challenge before Ontario Court of Appeal, though the Court reduced the punitive 
damages award from $500,000 to $100,000, which served to heighten anxiety among 
employers general.
When the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal 
both sides expected that the Court would provide some needed direction to all stake­
holders. It is unlikely that anyone fully anticipated the broad and sweeping impact 
the decision would ultimately have in wrongful dismissal law. The Court took the 
opportunity to emphasize the proper considerations when awarding damages in em­
ployment law cases and, in so doing, adopted an approach that was principled, rea­
soned and had as its foundation a well-established judicial methodology. In short, the 
Court “pulled back on the reins”, clearly re-establishing the principles to be applied by 
lower courts when awarding damages in employment law cases. This is a welcome 
decision that demonstrates how far the Supreme Court is prepared to go in order to 
“right the ship” where it believes lower courts have misapplied or otherwise extended 
principles established by the highest court beyond what was reasonably intended.
An understanding of the subtext is as important as the main findings in order
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to grasp the practical significance of Keays.
BACKGROUND
Kevin Keays commenced employment with Honda Canada Inc. (“Honda”) in 1986 
working on the production line at the assembly plant in Alliston, Ontario. After ap­
proximately twenty months, Mr. Keays joined the Quality Engineering Department. 
Mr. Keays was selected to receive training on a new computer system, created for the 
implementation of newly designed components into Honda vehicles, after which he 
was expected to instruct his fellow employees in the department on using the system.
Shortly after commencing work at Honda, Mr. Keays was absent from work 
as a result of health problems, which culminated in a disability leave in October of 
1996. Honda’s business philosophy mandated a “lean” operating structure such that 
Mr. Keays’ absences required his already busy co-workers to take on his responsi­
bilities in addition to their own. Mr. Keays was diagnosed as suffering from chronic 
fatigue syndrome (“CFS”) and though he returned to work in December of 1998, he 
did so under protest and then only upon the termination of his benefits by Honda’s 
long-term disability insurer.
Within a month of returning to work Mr. Keays once again began to experi­
ence absences from work, and in August of 1999 received a written “coaching” report 
from Honda with respect to his absenteeism. This was the first step in Honda’s pro­
gressive discipline process. When Mr. Keays complained that he was not able to live 
up to Honda’s attendance expectations, he was informed of a Honda program exempt­
ing employees from attendance-related progressive discipline based on a disability. 
Mr. Keays’ had his physician complete the necessary forms and informed Honda that 
he suffered from CFS and would likely miss about four days of work per month as a 
result.
Honda provided some accommodation for Mr. Keays’ absences, but he was 
required to provide a doctor’s note for each absence, a requirement not imposed on 
other employees. Following a six-day absence in October of 1999, Honda asked Mr. 
Keays to see the company doctor. When Mr. Keays later complained to his supervi­
sors that the doctor had threatened to move him back to the production line, the super­
visors told Mr. Keays that there was no intention to move him “at that time”.
In January and February of 2000 Mr. Keays requested that the written “ab­
senteeism” report be removed from his file and that Honda reconsider the requirement 
that he provide a doctor’s note for each absence. Mr. Keays retained counsel and his 
lawyer wrote to Honda outlining Mr. Keays’ concerns and extending an offer to at­
tempt to resolve their differences. Honda had an unwritten policy discouraging third 
parties advocating on behalf of employees and therefore did not respond to this letter.
Instead, Honda informed Mr. Keays that it no longer accepted that he had a disability 
requiring him to be absent, and directed him to meet with Honda’s occupational medi­
cine specialist.
Mr. Keays informed Honda that on the advice of his lawyer, he would not 
meet with the occupational medicine specialist unless and until he was provided with 
clarification regarding the “purpose, methodology and the parameters of the assess­
ment.” Honda refused to elaborate on the purpose of the meeting and warned Mr. 
Keays that if he did not meet with the doctor he would be terminated.
Honda terminated Mr. Keays’ employment when he did not meet with the 
doctor as instructed. Subsequent to his dismissal, Mr. Keays suffered from post-trau­
matic adjustment disorder, was unable to work, and qualified for a total disability 
pension.
KEAYS AT TRIAL AND APPEAL
At trial, Mclsaac J criticized Honda, in pointed and indeed scathing terms, 
for what he viewed as its harsh treatment of Mr. Keays. Ultimately, this criticism was 
not sufficiently founded to justify the “non-traditional” damages awards discussed in 
more detail below.
Mclsaac J found that Honda’s direction that Mr. Keays meet with the oc­
cupational medicine specialist was unreasonable, not made in good faith and was 
done in order to subsequently terminate Mr. Keays’ employment and avoid accom­
modating his disability. The trial judge determined that Mr. Keays had good rea­
son not to comply with Honda’s directives, and his refusal to see the company doc­
tor was not a repudiation of his contract of employment justifying the termination 
of his employment for just cause. Mclsaac J held that Honda’s reaction to Mr. 
Keays’ refusal to meet with its doctor was disproportionate. Not only did Honda 
not have just cause to terminate Mr. Keays, the trial judge also found that Honda 
had failed to fulfill its obligations to Mr. Keays under the Code. He described the 
company’s conduct as “outrageous” and deserving of significant denunciation.
As a result, Mclsaac J awarded punitive damages in the unprecedent­
ed amount of $500,000 for what he considered to be Honda’s “outrageous and 
high-handed” conduct that amounted to discrimination and harassment. He also 
determined that the period of reasonable notice, in the circumstances, was fif­
teen months’ salary, which he extended by nine months because of the “egre­
gious bad faith displayed by Honda” in the manner in which Mr. Keays’ em­
ployment was terminated and “the medical consequences flowing therefrom”.
Honda appealed and in a split decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside
the quantum of punitive damages and the cost premium awarded at trial, but otherwise 
left the trial judgment undisturbed.
Honda argued, in part, that the trial judgment “flew in the face o f’ Seneca 
College o f Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria (“Bhadauria”).2 The Court of 
Appeal disagreed and Goudge JA, in dissent, stated that:
Bhadauria determined that a civil action could not be based directly on 
a breach of the Ontario Human Rights Code. Indeed, in this case the 
respondent made just such a claim, which the trial judge dismissed, al­
beit reluctantly, by applying both Bhadauria and this court’s recent ap­
plication of that decision in Taylor v. Bank o f Nova Scotia.
In other words, the conduct in the context of a claim for punitive damages 
was not being advanced in support of a breach of the Code but as an “independent 
actionable wrong” and, on the evidence, an award of punitive damages was warranted. 
In terms of assessing the quantum of the punitive damage award, Goudge JA consid­
ered the following:
♦ The level of blameworthiness of the employer’s conduct;
♦ The degree of vulnerability of the employee;
♦ The harm to the employee; and
♦ The need for deterrence.
Goudge JA would have upheld the $500,000 in punitive damages 
award. Rosenberg JA, writing on behalf of himself and Feldman JA, agreed 
with Goudge JA in all respects save with respect to the quantum of punitive dam­
ages. The majority agreed with Gouge J.A.’s summation of the law after Bha­
dauria and, specifically, that a breach of human rights legislation could be re­
lied upon as the actionable wrong in support of a claim for punitive damages.
That said, the majority reduced the award from $500,000 to $100,000 be­
cause the trial judge relied on findings of fact not supported by the evidence and be­
cause the award failed to accord with the fundamental principle of proportionality.
Erroneous factual findings made by and relied upon by the trial judge were 
the following:3
2 Seneca College o f  Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181.
3 See Fitzgibbon, M. & Vachon, P., “Off the Beaten Path” Damages in Employment Law: How to Stay on 
the Trail (Presented at the Canadian Bar Association Conference) “Through the Frosted Glass: Practical
Honda’s misconduct was “planned and deliberate and formed a protracted 
corporate conspiracy”. The majority found that there was no evidence to support this 
allegation of a broad-based conspiracy.
Honda’s “outrageous conduct has persisted over a period of five years without 
a hint of modification of their position that Mr. Keays was the one in the wrong.” The 
majority characterized this as a “gross distortion of the circumstances and amounts to 
a palpable and overriding error.” There was no evidence to support the trial judge’s 
view that the “outrageous conduct” persisted over a period of five years. The majority 
concluded that “this case concerns a period of seven months not five years.”
There was misconduct by the insurer in the decision to terminate Mr. Keays’ 
long-term disability benefits. There was no evidence that Honda had anything to do 
with the insurer’s decision to terminate the benefits.
Honda “clearly benefited from their misconduct because they rid themselves 
of an irritation that they viewed as a ‘problem’ associate”. The majority found that 
there was nothing in the record to support this finding. Although Honda was skeptical 
of Mr. Keays’ disability and was taking steps to confirm the legitimacy of the disabil­
ity, there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Keays was viewed as a 
problem employee.
“Honda ran amok as a result of their blind insistence on production ‘effi­
ciency’ at the expense of their obligation to provide a long-time employee reasonable 
accommodation that included his own physician’s participation”. The majority found 
that this was “a distortion of the circumstances” and that there was nothing in the 
record to support that Honda “ran amok”. Though, relying on expert advice, some of 
Honda’s employees in positions of responsibility “made decisions that were clearly 
wrong”, that is not the same as “corporate malfeasance leveled at the appellant by the 
trial judge”.
Honda’s in-house counsel “breached the Rules of Professional Conduct 
of the Law Society of Upper Canada when she participated in the ‘scrum’ to at­
tempt to persuade Mr. Keays to abandon his request for clarification of Dr. Bren­
nan’s mandate.” Again, the majority found that even on Mr. Keays’ evidence, coun­
sel’s attendance was mere coincidence and in any event, that if it was a breach of 
the Rules, which the Court provided no opinion, it was merely a technical breach, 
and would not serve to increase punitive damages. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
where the trial judge came up with this, having regard to the timeline of events.
When the erroneous findings of fact are disregarded, the quantum of punitive 
damages could only be supported, according to the majority of the Court of Appeal, 
Advice and Trends Towards Transparency in the Law”, 24 and 25 November 2006).
by the following:
♦ The employer’s intent to intimidate and eventually termi­
nate the employee was for the purpose of depriving him of 
the accommodation he had earned.
♦ The employer did not reveal an extremely damaging letter 
from the occupational medicine specialist until late in the 
trial.
♦ The employer was aware of its obligation to accommodate 
and must have known it was wrong to terminate the ac­
commodation without just cause and terminate him as an 
act of retaliation.
♦ The employer knew that the employee valued his employ­
ment and that he was dependent upon it for disability ben­
efits.
♦ The employer knew that the employee was a victim of 
particular vulnerability because of his precarious medical 
condition.
♦ The employer refused to deal with the employee’s coun­
sel, who made a reasonable request to discuss accommo­
dation.
The Court observed that a review of other cases revealed that punitive dam­
ages awards were far more modest than awarded by the trial judge in Keays even in 
“the face of serious misconduct such as slander of the employee.” The Court described 
these awards as falling in the “range of $15,000 to $50,000 and, rarely, up to $75,000.”
In fixing the quantum, the Court highlighted a number of guiding principles 
gleaned from Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. (“Whiten”)*:
♦ In considering the need for deterrence, the Court empha­
sized, as did Binnie, J. in Whiten, that the relative size of 
the corporate defendant is “a factor of limited importance” 
in determining the quantum of the award.
4 Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] S.C.J. No. 19, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.).
♦ In considering the proportionality of the award, regard 
must be had to “the totality of all other penalties including 
compensatory damages imposed on the defendant.”
♦ Regard must be had to the duration of the impugned mis­
conduct.
♦ Regard must be had to whether the conduct towards the 
victim was malicious and high-handed.
♦ The need for the punitive damage award must be propor­
tional to the advantage wrongfully gained. Specifically, 
a “traditional function of punitive damages is to ensure 
that the defendant does not treat compensatory damages 
merely as a license to get its way irrespective of the legal 
or other rights of the plaintiff.”
While the majority of the Court significantly reduced the punitive damages 
award, the underlying principles upon which the award was based remained intact. 
Furthermore, all other aspects of the trial judgment were upheld including Wallace 
damages.5 It was with this background that the case came before the Supreme Court 
of Canada.
KEAYS AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to consider, expound upon and 
clarify a number of rudimentary employment law questions:
1. What factors can or should properly be considered in de­
termining the period of reasonable notice of termination?
2. Is there a civil cause of action of discrimination or can 
a breach of human rights legislation found an actionable 
wrong for purposes of a claim for punitive damages?
3. Would the Court establish a more principled approach for 
awarding so-called Wallace damages?
Though some might disagree, the Supreme Court dealt a significant 
blow to more exceptional employee damage claims, while affirming a histori­
cal and principled approach to awarding damages in wrongful dismissal cases.
5 Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701.
REVISITING BARDAL V. GLOBE AND MAIL LTD.
In the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary an employer may ter­
minate the employment of an employee for just cause or in the absence of just 
cause by providing reasonable notice or pay in lieu of reasonable notice at com­
mon law.6 Granted that determining the period of reasonable notice is more “art 
than science”, from the earliest times our courts have tried to provide some di­
rection regarding the manner in which reasonable notice is to be determined.7
The most often cited case in this area is Bardai, which in some jurisdictions has 
“taken on a canonical status”.8 The following words of McCruer J hardly need repeating:
There can be no catalogue laid down as to what is reasonable notice in 
particular classes of cases. The reasonableness of the notice must be de­
cided with reference to each particular case, having regard to the char­
acter of the employment, the length of service of the servant, the age of 
the servant and the availability of similar employment, having regard 
to the experience, training and qualifications of the servant.9
The object of the damage assessment is compensatory and is intended to 
restore the employee to the financial position he or she would have been in had the 
employer provided the appropriate notice.
Determining the period of reasonable notice is an individualized exercise and 
there has been a general reluctance to apply a formulaic or mathematical approach to 
the endeavor. McCruer J’s comment of nearly a half-century ago remains applicable 
today—there really can’t be a closed catalogue of factors laid down for determining 
the period of reasonable notice. The amount of reasonable notice will vary from case 
to case having regard to the circumstances and the factors that the Court believes are 
important.
While courts have considered an ever-expanding and seemingly lim­
itless number of factors when determining the notional period of reason­
able notice of termination, a number of important principles have emerged:
♦ Since determining the period of reasonable notice is “more
6 Machtinger v. HOJIndustries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986, [1992] S.C.J. No. 41 and, more recently, Lloyd 
v. Oracle Corporation Canada Inc., [2004] OJ. No. 1806, [2004] O.T.C. 363.
7 McKay v. Eaton Yale Ltd. (1996), 31 O.R. (3d) 216, [1996] OJ. No. 3982.
8 Bardai v. Globe and Mail Ltd., [1960] OJ. No. 149,24 D.L.R. (2d) 140; B.D. Mulroney, “The Ontario 
Employment Law Year in Review (2007-2008)” (Paper presented to the CACE Conference, 18 September, 
2008) [unpublished].
9 Bardai, supra note 8 at para. 21.
art than science,” most wrongful dismissal cases will yield 
a “range of reasonableness”.10
♦ A trial judge’s determination of the period of reasonable 
notice is entitled to deference from an appellate court “un­
less the figure arrived at by the trial judge is outside an ac­
ceptable range or unless, in arriving at the figure, the trial 
judge erred in principle or made an unreasonable finding 
of fact. If the trial judge erred in principle, an appellate 
court may substitute its own figure. But it should do so 
sparingly if the trial judge’s award is within an acceptable 
range despite the error in principle.”11
♦ Courts have resisted any formulaic approach when resolv­
ing the period of reasonable notice such as the ever-pop- 
ular (though routinely rejected) “one month per year of 
service” rule of thumb. Those who have studied common 
law termination cases closely have long concluded that 
this rule of thumb does not accurately reflect Canadian ju­
dicial practice. In fact, an analysis of over 1600 wrongful 
dismissal cases reveals that only employees with prior ser­
vice between six and fifteen years receive, on average, one 
month of notice per year of service. Accordingly, the rule 
of thumb is not a useful guideline for employees with very 
short service (0-6 years) or for those with lengthy service 
(15+ years). Furthermore, and possibly most importantly, 
the “rule of thumb” places emphasis on one factor (length 
of service) while ignoring all of the others. The Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice in Stone v. SDS Kerr Beavers 
Dental, A Division o f Sybron Canada Ltd. recently sum­
marized the generally accepted approach: “In assessing 
damages for wrongful dismissal, the Court should not 
apply as a starting point any general principle or rule of 
thumb that an employee is entitled to one month’s notice 
for every year worked, subject to adjustments upwards or 
downwards. Instead, the Court should undertake a careful 
weighing and blending of all relevant factors before arriv­
ing at a notice period.”12
10 McKay, supra note 7 at para. 4.
11 Minott v. O ’Shanter Development Company Ltd., (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), [1999] O.J. No. 5. at 
para. 62.
12 Geoffrey England, Employment Law in Canada, (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2005) at para 
14.107; Barry Fisher, “Measuring the Rule of Thumb in Wrongful Dismissal Cases” (1998), 31 C.C.E.L. 
(2d) 311 ; Stone v. SDS Kerr Beavers Dental, A Division o f Sybron Canada Ltd. [2006] O.J. No. 2532, 149 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 251 at para. 158.
♦ There has been a development of a rough upper limit on 
reasonable notice of twenty-four months. For example, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal and the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal have concluded that that notice periods 
greater than 24 months will be rare and exceptional.13
All this being said, Mclsaac J in Keays reviewed and considered the Bardai criteria 
and concluded that the reasonable notice period was 15 months. In reaching this 
conclusion, he relied upon the traditional Bardai criteria as well as:
♦ “Honda’s “flat” (i.e., egalitarian) management structure” 
which, he reasoned, limited the effect of Mr. Keays’ lower 
position in Honda’s hierarchy;
♦ Mr. Keays’ specialized training which compensated for 
his lack of formal education; and
♦ The lack of comparable employment in Alliston.
Bastarache J, on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court, was critical of 
the trial judge’s consideration of these “other factors” especially where they provided 
no insight into what Mr. Keays actually did for Honda. Bastarache J observed that at 
least two provincial appellate courts had questioned the relevance of an employee’s 
position in the hierarchy in assessing damages for wrongful dismissal but then went 
on to note that the “traditional assumptions about the relevance of a person’s position 
in the hierarchy was not directly challenged in this case.”14 However, the majority of 
the Court concluded that:
The “flat management structure” said nothing of Keays’ employ­
ment. It does not describe the responsibilities and skills o f that work­
er, nor the character of the lost employment. The particu lar cir­
cumstances o f  the individual should be the concern o f  the courts in 
determining the appropriate p e r io d  o f  reasonable notice. Traditional 
presumptions about the role that managerial level plays in reasonable 
notice can always be rebutted by evidence. [Emphasis added]
Accordingly, Honda’s management structure had “no part to play in determin­
ing reasonable notice in this case.” This finding may be especially telling as organiza­
13 Lowndes v. Summit Ford Sales Limited, [2006] O.J. No. 13, 206 O.A.C. 55; Clendenning v. Lowndes 
Lambert (B.C.) Ltd., [2000] B.C.C.A. 644, 82 B.C.L.R. (3d) 239. In Burry v. Unitel Communications Inc., 
[1996] B.C.J. No. 1816, 65 A.C.W.S. (3d) 46 The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that 24 
months was a rough upper limit on reasonable notice.
14 Bramble v. Medis Health and Pharmaceutical Service Inc., [1999] N.BJ. No. 307, 214 N.B.R. (2d) 111 
(C.A.) and Byers v. Prince George (Cityj Downtown Parking Commission, (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 435 
(C.A.).
tions restructure their operations in the context of the current economic circumstances.
The Court affirmed that no single Bardai factor should be given “dispro­
portionate weight” over the others and, in the circumstances of the Keays case, the 
Court held that the “trial judge erred in applying one of the factors, alluding to the 
flat management structure, rather than examining the actual functions of Keays.” In 
reality, the Court accepted Honda’s argument on appeal, that it was Mr. Keays’ actual 
job functions that had to be considered in assessing the extent of his entitlement to 
reasonable notice.
In endorsing Bardai as the proper approach for determining reasonable 
notice, and in spite of the identified errors committed at trial, the Court nonethe­
less refused to reduce the 15-month period of reasonable notice. In doing so, and 
despite the comment that no single Bardai factor should be given “dispropor­
tionate weight”, the Supreme Court of Canada went on to consider the following:
♦ Keays was one of the first employees hired at Honda’s 
plant;
♦ Keays spent his entire adult working life with Honda;
♦ Keays did not have any formal education; and
♦ Keays suffered from an illness that greatly incapacitated 
him.
The Court found that “all these factors will substantially reduce his 
chances of re-employment” and were relevant to the manner of determin­
ing the period of reasonable notice. Interestingly, as will be discussed be­
low, this was the approach endorsed by the dissenting justices in Wallace.1520
ACTIONABLE WRONGS, THE TORT OF DISCRIMINATION AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Where aggravated damages are designed to compensate, punitive damages are de­
signed to punish. The conduct must be, in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Hill v. Church ofScientology o f Toronto, “so malicious, oppressive and high-handed 
that it offends the court’s sense of decency... It is the means by which the jury or judge 
expresses its outrage at the egregious conduct of the defendant.”16 Not only must the
15 Wallace, supra note 5, McLachlin, J, dissenting.
16 Hill v. Church o f Scientology o f  Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64.
conduct meet this lofty standard, but it must also amount to an “actionable wrong.” 
Furthermore, punitive damages will not be awarded unless they serve a rational pur­
pose such as where the other damages awarded are sufficient to achieve the purpose 
of, for example, deterrence.
As a threshold matter, an award of punitive damages will only be jus­
tified where there is conduct on the part of the defendant that, in itself, gives 
rise, to an “actionable wrong.” 17 Binnie J in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. re­
viewed this in a comprehensive fashion and concluded that an actionable wrong 
did not require a finding that an “independent tort” had been committed, as some 
had argued.Instead, an actionable wrong could be found where there has been 
a breach of the contractual duty of good faith, a breach of a separate and dis­
tinct contractual provision or “other duty such as a fiduciary obligation.”18
The Court in Whiten also clarified the appropriate approach for awarding 
punitive damages:
...the incantation of the time-honoured péjoratives (‘high-handed’, ‘op­
pressive’, ‘vindictive’, etc.) provides insufficient guidance (or disci­
pline) to the judge or jury setting the amount.... A more principled and 
less exhortatory approach is desirable. ...all jurisdictions seek to pro­
mote ra tionality ... the court should relate the facts of the particular case 
to the underlying purposes of punitive damages and ask itself how, in 
particular, an award would further one or other of the objectives of the 
law, and what is the low est aw ard  that would serve the purpose, i.e., be­
cause any higher aw ard w ould be irrational. ...the governing rule for 
quantum is proportionality. The overall award, that is to say compensa­
tory damages plus punitive damages plus any other punishment related 
to the same misconduct, should be rationally related to the objective for 
which the punitive damages are awarded... [emphasis added]
“Rationality” applies to both the question of whether an award of punitive 
damages should be made at all, and to the question of its quantum. The majority held:
If the award of punitive damages, when added to the compensatory 
damages, produces a total sum that is so ‘inordinately large’ that it ex­
ceeds what is ‘rationally’ required to punish the defendant, it will be re­
duced or set aside on appeal. Retribution, denunciation and deterrence 
are the recognized justification for punitive damages, and the means 
must be rationally proportionate to the end sought to be achieved. A dis­
proportionate award overshoots its purpose and becomes irrational.
A less than proportionate award fails to achieve its purpose.
17 Vorvis v. Insurance Bureau o f British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, [1989] S.C.J. No. 46.
18 Whiten, supra note 4.
In Keays, the trial judge and the Court of Appeal reasoned that Honda’s “dis­
criminatory conduct” amounted to an independent actionable wrong for the purposes 
of awarding punitive damages. This conclusion appeared to depart from the long 
established principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Seneca College o f Applied 
Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria (“Bhadauria ”), where the Court held that a plaintiff 
was precluded from pursuing a common law remedy for discrimination when human 
rights legislation contained a comprehensive enforcement scheme for violations of its 
terms.19
In considering the issue of the independent civil cause of action of dis­
crimination and the principles applicable when awarding punitive damages, 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Keays considered three interdependent issues:
1. whether a breach of human rights legislation amounted 
to an independent actionable wrong for the purposes of 
awarding punitive damages;
2. the circumstances in which punitive damages should be 
awarded; and
3. whether punitive damages were justified in this case.
Although Mr. Keays and others argued that the time was right for 
the Court to reconsider its conclusion in Bhadauria, Bastarache J refused to 
do so and, indeed, reaffirmed the principles established in the earlier case:
It is my view that the Code provides a comprehensive scheme
for the treatment of claims of discrimination and Bhadauria es­
tablished that a breach of the Code cannot constitute an ac­
tionable wrong; the legal requirement is not met.
Further, in considering that the underlying purpose of the Code 
was to remedy the effects of discrimination, it was reasoned that if a breach 
to the Code was actionable in common law courts, it would encourage liti­
gants to use the Code to punish employers who discriminate against em­
ployees and that this was in conflict with what the legislature intended.
With respect to the second issue noted above, Bastarache J explained that 
courts should only resort to punitive damages in exceptional cases, where the wrongful 
conduct was so malicious and outrageous as to be deserving of punishment and judi­
cial censure on its own. Quoting Vorvis, Bastarache J observed that “conduct meriting
19 Bhadauria, supra note 2.
punitive damages awards must be “harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and malicious,” as 
well as “extreme in its nature and such that by any reasonable standard it is deserving 
of full condemnation and punishment.”
As with aggravated damages, the Court was unanimous in the view that there 
was no basis for the claim for punitive damages on the facts of this case and that these 
did not, in any way, demonstrate such malicious or outrageous conduct which warrant­
ed an award of punitive damages. Further, even if the facts justified an award of puni­
tive damages, Mr. Keays received compensatory damages and this should have been 
considered in determining whether punitive damages were necessary. In other words, 
the damage award as a whole must be considered when deciding whether to award 
punitive damages (even where the underpinnings of this claim have been established).
On the specific facts of Keays, Bastarache J was of the view that there was 
no stereotyping or arbitrariness in the requirement that medical notes be produced to 
establish that absences were in fact related to the disability. He also accepted that 
the need to monitor absences of employees who are regularly absent from work is 
a bona fide work requirement. This latter finding is significant support for atten­
dance management programs that are implemented and reasonably administered.
Bastarache J further affirmed that the insurer’s decision to cut off Mr. 
Keays’ long-term disability benefits had nothing to do with Honda and Hon­
da could not be held responsible for it. As such, the trial judge’s attribution 
of the insurer’s decision to Honda and decision to allow punitive damages on 
this basis was wrong. Finally, while Honda’s statement to Mr. Keays that hir­
ing outside counsel was a mistake and would make things worse was ill ad­
vised and unnecessarily harsh, it did not justify an award of punitive damages.
The dissenting judgment in Keays, written by Lebel J on behalf of himself 
and Fish J, must not be overlooked in this discussion. While agreeing that a reconsid­
eration of Bhadauria was not necessary, the dissenting justices were nonetheless of the 
view that Chief Justice Laskin in Bhadauria “went further than was strictly necessary” 
and that:
The main thrust of the decision was that Ms. Bhadauria did not have a le­
gally protected interest at common law that had been harmed by the de­
fendant’s allegedly discriminatory conduct (pp. 191-92). However, rather 
than stop there, Laskin C.J. went on to hold that The Ontario Human 
Rights Code “foreclose[s] any civil action based directly upon a breach 
thereof [and] also excludes any common law action based on an invo­
cation of the public policy expressed in the Code” (p. 195). These con­
clusions imply (and have been interpreted to mean) that any allegations 
resembling the type of conduct that is prohibited by the Code cannot be 
litigated at common law. The Code covers a broad range of conduct in
promoting the goal of equality. Yet the conduct at issue in Bhadauria  was 
limited to the facts of that case. It would have been sufficient to simply 
conclude that the interest advanced by Ms. Bhadauria was not protected 
at common law. It was not necessary for this Court to preclude all com­
mon law actions based on all forms of discriminatory conduct.
The dissenting judges posited that the “development of tort law ought 
not to be frozen forever on the basis of this obiter dictum. The legal landscape 
has changed. The strong prohibitions of human rights codes and of the Char­
ter have informed many aspects of the development of the common law.”
RESTATEMENT OF WALLACE DAMAGES
The Court took up the mantle handed them in the appeal in Keays to, in effect, revisit 
Wallace damages. In so doing, the Court dealt a significant blow to plaintiffs who 
purport to advance these claims in future employment cases. The Court believed that 
this was necessary in light of its recent decision in Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. o f  
Canada (“Fidler”).20 Clarification of Wallace was certainly welcome given the man­
ner in which lower courts had applied the Wallace principles which, with respect, was 
far from satisfactory and largely inconsistent with damage principles in other areas.
By way of background, Wallace established that the contract of employment 
included an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal and 
that an employer breaching this duty was liable for “additional damages.” Where it 
was found that the employer acted in bad faith, courts in common law provinces ex­
tended the period of notice by some indeterminate, unscientific and, arguably, random 
amount (this extension of the notice period became known as the “ Wallace bump”).
The dissenting judgment in Wallace, written by McLachlin J (as she then 
was) on behalf of herself, La Forest J and L’Heureux-Dubé J, must not be over­
looked in this discussion as it was, in a number of important respects, adopted by 
the majority in Keays (at which time, it will be observed, McLachlin was Chief 
Justice of the Court and was in the majority). It should also be noted that the dis­
senting Wallace judgment has, with few exceptions, found support in Quebec where 
“moral” damages are awarded, on well established compensatory principles rather 
than through an extension of the period of reasonable notice.21 McLachlin J in Wal­
lace differed from the majority, written by Iacobucci J, in a number of respects:
My colleague, Iacobucci J., holds that the manner of dismissal may 
be considered generally in defining the notice period for wrongful dis­
missal. An alternative v iew  is that the manner o f  d ism issal should  
only be considered in defining the notice p e r io d  where the manner
20 Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. o f Canada, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, [2006] S.C.J. No. 30.
21 Fitzgibbon and Vachon, supra note 3.
o f  dism issal impacts on the difficulty o f  finding replacem ent em ploy­
ment, and that absent this connection, dam ages fo r  the manner o f  ter­
mination must be based  on som e other cause o f  action.
I prefer the second approach for the following reasons. First, this solution 
seems to me more consistent with the nature of the action for wrongful dis­
missal. Second, this approach, unlike the alternative, honours the principle 
that damages must be grounded in a cause of action. Third, this approach 
seems to me more consistent with the authorities, notably Vorvis v. Insur­
ance Corporation o f  British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, per McIntyre 
J. Fourth, this approach will better aid certainty and predictability in the 
law governing damages for termination of employment. Finally, there are 
other equally effective ways to remedy wrongs related to the manner of 
dismissal, which do not affect the prospect of finding replacement work. I 
will discuss in turn each of these reasons for preferring the second alterna­
tive. [Emphasis added]
With that background, we return to Keays. In analyzing Wallace damages, the 
Court considered the 1854 case of Hadley v. Baxendale , where it was held that dam­
ages are recoverable for a contractual breach if the damages are “such as may fairly 
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally ... from such breach of contract 
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of 
both parties.”22
The first question is: what did the parties contemplate at the time of the for­
mation of the contract? The Court held that:
At the time the contract was formed, there would not ordinarily be 
contemplation of psychological damage resulting from the dismissal 
since the dismissal is a clear legal possibility. The normal distress and 
hurt feelings resulting from dismissal are not compensable.
The Court then affirmed that in the employment law context, dam­
ages resulting from the manner of dismissal will be available if they re­
sult from the circumstances described in Wallace, namely where the employ­
er engages in conduct during the course of dismissal that is “unfair or is in 
bad faith by being, for example, untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive.”
In other words, it would have been in the contemplation of the parties at 
the time the contract was formed for damages to result when the circumstances 
described in Wallace are present. It would be both foreseeable and compensable.
Since the release of Wallace in 1997, common law judges have compensated
22 Hadley v. Baxendale, [1854] C.C.S. NO. 11.
employees for bad faith conduct of the employer through an extension of the period 
of reasonable notice. In Keays, the Court determined that this approach was incorrect. 
Bastarache J held:
...if  the employee can prove that the manner of dismissal caused mental 
distress that was in the contemplation of the parties, those damages will be 
awarded not through an arbitrary extension of the notice period, but through 
an award that reflects the actual damages. Examples of conduct in dismissal 
resulting in compensable damages are attacking the employee’s reputation 
by declarations made at the time of dismissal, misrepresentation regarding 
the reason for the decision, or dismissal meant to deprive the employee of 
a pension benefit or other right, permanent status for instance.
In other words, courts will have to come up with an actual number reflecting 
the damages that the employee suffered, if any, by reason of the “bad faith” conduct of 
the employer. Accordingly, courts should apply normally accepted damage principles, 
a methodology with which they of course have ample experience.
The approach taken by the lower courts in awarding both Wal­
lace damages and punitive damages exemplified the confusion between dam­
ages for conduct in dismissal (i.e. Wallace damages) and punitive damag­
es. By awarding both types of damages, courts were, effectively, awarding 
“double compensation” to the employee and “double punishment” for the employer.
The Supreme Court’s methodology will likely significantly limit the circum­
stances in which the damages formerly known as Wallace damages will be awarded. 
This will provide a measure of comfort to practitioners when advising their clients 
not only about the types of conduct that might give rise to such exceptional claims, 
but also about the potential damages flowing from such a finding and the evidentiary 
requirements on the plaintiff associated with proving his or her claim.
This is welcome, as Wallace claims have, since 1997, been the “hobby­
horse” for many plaintiffs and their lawyers, even when such claims had little or no 
chance of success. Indeed, a number of judges began to lose patience with plaintiffs 
advancing specious Wallace claims and, one hopes, the more restrictive approach 
endorsed in Keays will ensure that only meritorious claims are brought to trial.23
23 See, for example, Yanez v. Canac Kitchens (2004), at para. 40,45 C.C.E.L. (3d) 7 (Ont. SCJ) where 
the Court observed “The time has now come to express the Court’s disapproval of routine assertions 
of “Wallace damage” claims which are not justified on the facts.... Such claims seriously impede 
the potential consensual resolution of disputes which could otherwise be settled well short of trial. 
Additionally, the assertion and defence of specious “Wallace claims” can consume large amounts of 
valuable court time; can increase the costs to all concerned; and can generally drive the parties apart....
Unmeritorious “Wallace claims” for bad faith firings ought not to be an apparently automatic inclusion for 
every plaintiff’s prayer for relief.”
The Court, after reviewing the “major overriding and palpable errors” at trial, 
determined that no breach had occurred in the manner of dismissal and thus no dam­
ages followed.
RECENT JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF KEAYS
A handful of judgments have considered and applied Keays and, though these 
are early days, the cases suggest that courts are using a restrictive approach to 
awarding damages and a more restrained approach when assessing the inde­
pendent actionable wrong upon which a claim for punitive damages is founded.
In Ahmed v. Edmonton Public School Board the Acting Chief Commis­
sioner of the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission dismissed Mr. 
Ahmed’s appeal of the finding of an Investigative Officer who concluded that there 
was no direct evidence of religious bias in a school’s rejection of Mr. Ahmed’s 
daughters’ application.24 The Officer considered circumstantial evidence in reach­
ing his decision and the Acting Chief Commissioner concluded there was ample 
support for the view that there had been no religious bias in this case. Mr. Ahmed 
sought to overturn this decision and asked that the Court decide the issue of reli­
gious bias itself rather than remit the matter back to the adjudicator for determination.
The Court denied the request and, in so doing, relied upon Keays for the 
proposition that “courts have no jurisdiction in matters of discrimination within the ex­
clusive domain of human rights commissions” and that “discrimination is not an inde­
pendent actionable wrong”. Keays ’ affirmation of Bhadauria was relied upon by the 
Court in Ahmed to make short work of the direct claim being advanced in that case.25
Pawlett v. Dominion Protection Services Ltd. was an appeal of a trial deci­
sion in which Ms. Pawlett was found to have been constructively dismissed as a result 
of sexual harassment and assault by her supervisor.26 She was awarded damages for 
wrongful dismissal, Wallace damages and punitive damages for the manner of dis­
missal as well as general damages for the tort of sexual battery. The employer and 
supervisor appealed.
The Court of Appeal observed that the trial judge did not have the benefit of 
Keays and emphasized, as did the Supreme Court of Canada that “punitive damages 
should only be resorted to in exceptional cases”. The Court specifically commented 
on the caution of double compensation and double punishment discussed in Keays:
24 (2008), ABQB 351 (QB).
25 The court commented in a direct application of Bhadauria at paragraph 30 that “ ... it is not this Court 
but the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission which has the legal authority to deal with 
claims of discrimination of the type raised by Mr. Ahmed.”
26 2008 ABCA 369, [2008] A.J. No. 1191.
With respect, the trial judge fell into the same error in this case as 
did the lower courts in Keays. The same conduct underlays the 
award of Wallace damages for conduct in dismissal, the award of 
general damages for the tort, and the punitive damages.
The Court went on to state that the general damages award was denunciatory 
rather than compensatory and thus was outside of the damage principles emphasized 
in Keays. The purpose of the damages award is all-important.
The Court concluded that, in the circumstances, an award of puni­
tive damages was justified. The Court reduced the punitive damages significantly 
from the $50,000 awarded at trial to $5,000 and, in doing so, was mindful of the 
comment in Keays to the effect that the entire damages awarded must be assessed 
in deciding whether these other damages were sufficient for the purpose of denun­
ciation, deterrence and retribution. The court reasoned in Pawlett that the conduct 
was reprehensible and “cries out for deterrence” but that the damage award, as a 
whole, did not justify the $50,000 in punitive damages awarded by the trial judge.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in McNevan v. AmeriCredit Corp. over­
turned a trial judgment that, among other things, awarded an employee a six- 
month notice period plus a Wallace extension of six months.27 This is an im­
portant case because although it was heard prior to the release of Keays, it 
follows the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in that case.28
The Court in McNevan was critical of the trial judge’s consideration of “ex­
tended” Bardai factors in arriving at the applicable period of reasonable notice.
The Court emphasized that it was generally reluctant to interfere with 
the trial judge’s assessment of the period of reasonable notice, relying on Min- 
nott v. O ’Shanter Development Co. where the court noted that determining the pe­
riod of reasonable notice was “more art than science”.29 However, an appellate 
court will intervene to overturn a trial judgment where, in its judgment, the as­
sessment of the period of reasonable notice lies outside an acceptable range or 
where the trial judge erred in principle or made an unreasonable finding of fact.
In this case, the trial judge, in arriving at a six-month notice period, re­
lied on the company’s purported failure to warn the employee about dissatisfac­
tion with his job performance. The Court of Appeal said that by doing so the trial 
judge had relied upon irrelevant criteria. Of interest is that this general approach 
is consistent with that of Bastarache J in Keays, where he was critical of the trial
27 [2008] O.J. No. 5081, 2008 ONCA 846.
28 The Court asked for submissions from counsel following the release of Keays, though it was not 
necessary for the Court to consider these in light of the conclusions that it reached on the record.
29 Minott, supra note 11 at para. 62.
judge’s consideration of Honda’s “flat management structure” and Keays’ place in 
the hierarchy in determining the notice period. What is relevant is what the em­
ployee does, not extraneous factors that do not inform specifically upon that.
While finding that this was not a proper consideration, the Court of 
Appeal nonetheless upheld the trial judge’s assessment of the period of rea­
sonable notice, which was generous but not outside the reasonable range.
With respect to the Wallace extension granted by the trial judge, the Court 
found that the trial judge’s consideration of the employer’s failure to warn the em­
ployee of performance issues in extending the notice period on the basis of Wallace 
was not appropriate. The Court also found that the following were not proper factors 
upon which to find bad faith:
... the failure to provide a reference letter; the failure to offer assis­
tance in a job search; and the offer of three months’ salary in lieu of 
notice which was conditional on the signing of a release.
The Court had the following to say:
This court has recognized that an employer is under no legal obligation to 
provide a letter of reference: see Titus v. William F. Cooke Enterprises Inc.
2007 ONCA 573 (CanLII), (2007), 284 D.L.R. (4th) 734 (Ont. C.A.), at 
para. 42. Moreover, McNevan never asked for a letter of reference, or for 
assistance in finding another job. Further, in the circumstances, I do not 
regard AmeriCredit’s request for McNevan to sign a general release before 
receiving a severance package as high-handed or in bad faith: see Wilson 
v. Goodyear Canada Inc. 2007 BCCA 136 (CanLII), (2007), 66 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 99 (C.A.). Rather, an offer of severance conditional on the execution 
of a release is not only standard, but also wise corporate practice.
The trial judge also relied on the employer’s post-employment conduct in 
relation to the employee’s personal property, some delays in dealing with payment of 
vacation pay, the delivery of his T4 and Record of Employment and the refund of de­
ductions on the employee’s paycheque in extending the notice period under Wallace. 
30 The Court of Appeal held that “there is no evidence that the company was unduly 
insensitive in the manner in which it dealt with” these matters and overturned the Wal­
lace damages.
To similar effect, aggravated or moral damages were refused in Colwell v. 
Cornerstone Properties Inc. in a constructive dismissal case where an allegation of
30 The employer had packed up the personal property and shipped them to the employee. Unfortunately, 
“in the process, a glass candy jar broke and an ice tea can punctured, causing damage to some 
photographs.”
breach of privacy was advanced.31
The impact of Keays on Wallace damages was also considered in Fox v. Sil­
ver Sage Housing Corporation where the court noted:
In Wallace, damages were awarded by extending the period of no­
tice. Keays altered the method of calculating damages. The court 
stated that the award of damages is meant to be compensatory. 
Therefore, it must reflect the damages actually suffered.32
The Court refused to award any damages even though it found that the em­
ployer’s conduct was not candid, reasonable or in good faith since the plaintiff was 
unable to prove that he suffered actual damages as a result of the manner of dismissal 
as opposed to the dismissal itself.33
To a similar effect was Desforge v. E-D Roofing Limited, where the court 
noted that although the dismissal of the employee might have been carried out dif­
ferently, it lacked the “necessary degree of malice, blatant disregard for the em­
ployee, callous and insensitive treatment, or ‘playing hardball’ that would jus­
tify Wallace-type damages.”34 Furthermore, and in any event, the plaintiff was 
unable to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that any mental distress he suf­
fered was a result of the manner of dismissal, rather than the dismissal itself. No 
medical evidence was advanced, though it was available and, once again, the 
normal hurt feelings associated with being terminated are not compensable.
While this handful of cases is insufficient to establish a trend, what 
seems to be emerging is a more exacting standard for establishing what are ad­
mittedly exceptional damages. Keays will likely continue to have this impact 
with moral and punitive damages being rarely awarded in employment cases.
CONCLUSION
As with any case of significance, the impact of Keays will only be fully seen in its 
application by lower courts. However, the following principles seem apparent:
♦_________ The Bardai factors remain the most important when de­
termining the period of reasonable notice. Though other 
factors will be considered, the emphasis here is on the par- 
__________ ticular circumstances of the employee and on the actual
31 Colwell v. Cornerstone Properties Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 5092, CanLII 66139 (ON S.C.).
32 Fox v. Silver Sage Housing Corp., [2008] SJ. No. 477, 2008 SKQB 321 (CanLII).
33 The court commented “As bad as this employer’s behaviour was towards Mr. Fox, he has not proven 
that the stress and depression he suffered is related to the manner in which he was treated.”
34 Desforge v. E-D Roofing Ltd., [2008] O.J. No. 3720,69 C.C.E.L. (3d) 115.
work of the employee.
♦ Subject to the amendments to the Ontario Human Rights 
Code, employers should not be litigating human rights 
claims as many pundits feared following the release of the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Keays. The fact is that the 
Supreme Court affirmed Bhadauria.
♦ Punitive damage claims in employment law cases should 
be rare and awarded only in circumstances where other 
damages do not adequately address the wrong.
♦ Wallace damages should also be exceptional. Though the 
Court acknowledged that it would be in the contemplation 
of the parties at the time of the formation of the employ­
ment contract that an employee would suffer damages if 
the employer acted in bad faith, it also emphasized that 
the Court was now required to quantify the damages in the 
usual way rather than through arbitrarily extension of the 
notice period.
♦ Courts must be vigilant to avoid the pitfalls of “double 
compensation” and “double punishment” in their damage 
awards.
♦ The subtext of Keays is that employers can, and indeed 
should, manage absenteeism and disability issues in their 
workplace. An employer will not be found to have acted 
in a “hardball” or offensive manner merely because it 
managed absenteeism in a proactive way. As Bastarache 
J noted, “I accept that the need to monitor the absences of 
employees who are regularly absent from work is a bona 
fide work requirement in light of the very nature of the 
employment contract and responsibility of the employer 
for the management of its workforce.” While these com­
ments are of assistance to employers, they should not be 
taken as a judicial green light to manage absenteeism in a 
manner that is not, objectively, fair and sensitive.
While courts are quick to emphasize that employment law cases are “differ­
ent” from, for example, commercial disputes, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded 
that those differences were insufficient to justify, in broad terms, departing from his­
torical damages principles.35
Keays also demonstrates that the Supreme Court of Canada is prepared to 
intervene and “right a ship” that it believes has drifted off course. In Keays, the Court 
took the occasion to enforce generally accepted damages principles, and clarify both 
Bhadauria and Wallace. This approach was more recently seen in Hydro Québec 
v. Syndicat des employées de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d ’Hydro- 
Québec, section locale 2000, where the Court felt the need to clarify the confusion 
created by its earlier decision in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Rela­
tions Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees ’ Union 
(B.C.G.S.E.U.) (Meiorin Grievance) dealing with the duty to accommodate.36
Some may view these decisions as signaling the advent of a more interven­
tionist Supreme Court which will find a way to substitute its views for those of lower 
courts where they merely disagree with their decisions. A careful reading of Keays 
and Hydro Québec may suggest otherwise. In both cases, the Court tried to restrict the 
manner in which lower courts applied principles developed by the Supreme Court in 
earlier cases.
In any event, the impact of Keays cannot be understated and will be felt for 
some time as lower courts come to grips with its significance, meaning and applica­
tion. Keays signals a return to a simpler damages regime grounded in well-established 
damages principles. Certainly, the impact of Keays is that plaintiffs will face some fur­
ther evidentiary hurdles when trying to prove so-called “exceptional” damages claims.
35 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (S.C.C.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
313 where it was observed that “Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing 
the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A 
person’s employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and emotional 
well-being.” and, more recently, Wallace where Iacobucci, J. observed that “The contract of employment 
has many characteristics that set it apart from the ordinary commercial contract” and then went on to 
describe those differences.
36 Keays, supra note 1; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British 
Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.) (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.CJ. No. 46.
